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TRANSFORMATION AND THE NAVY’S
TOUGH CHOICES AHEAD
What Are the Options for Policy Makers?
Ronald O’Rourke

A

fter a decade of making painful choices and implementing wrenching changes,
it now seems that policy makers face another set of potentially far-reaching
decisions concerning the future of the Navy. These new decisions, which are
driven in large part by a significant apparent mismatch between current programs
and potential resources, could significantly affect the structure and capabilities of
the Navy over the next twenty years or more. Some of the most significant of the
new choices concern the concept of military transformation: What does it mean
for the Navy? What might be involved in implementing it?
There are many ways to explore this issue. This article begins by focusing on
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WHERE WE ARE: THE BALANCE BETWEEN
PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
Policy makers cannot develop or assess options for future naval forces until they first assess where the Navy
currently stands, and from a programs-versus-resources
perspective, the first thing to be said about the current
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situation is that the Navy’s
current programs collectively
appear to be significantly
larger than its budget.
Take, for example, just one
portion of that budget—the
shipbuilding account, which
is intended to support the
currently planned fleet of
about 310 ships. (This figure
includes fifty-five attack submarines, up from fifty in the
1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review.) The shipbuilding
account currently provides
an average of about $7.9 billion per year for actual procurement of new ships and
procures a mix of about 7.5
ships per year (see tables 1
a n d 2 ) . In c re a s i n g t h e
ship-procurement rate to
about 8.7 ships per year—the
s te a d y - s t a te r a te f o r a
310-ship Navy—and adjusting the mix of ships procured
to reflect the planned mix of
ships in the 310-ship plan
would require the shipbuilding account to be increased by
about two billion dollars per
year. A bit less than four billion dollars in additional
funding per year would be
needed to achieve and maintain a procurement rate of
10.2 ships per year, which is
what would be needed after
fiscal year (FY) 2005 to work
off the backlog of deferred
2
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ship procurement that has accumulated relative to the steady-state rate since fiscal 1993. About five billion dollars in additional funds per year might be needed
to adjust the mix of these 10.2 ships to compensate for the fact that the ships
procured since the early 1990s have included a less-than-proportionate share of
1
submarines, which are more expensive than most other types of ships.
That would be two billion to five billion dollars in additional required funding per year—for just one of the Navy’s appropriation accounts. Other individual Navy accounts would not require nearly as much additional money to fund
fully, but it appears that several program areas could easily absorb increases of
from several hundred million dollars to more than a billion dollars a year if the
programs in these areas were to be more fully funded.
The “Procurement, Marine Corps” account, for example, has a steady-state
funding requirement of about $1.2 billion a year. The FY 2001 budget returns this
account to about that level, but because this account was funded at about one-half
of that level for several years, the Marine Corps states that it must now increase this
account to about $1.8 billion a year—an additional six hundred million dollars for
each of the next several years. Similar things could be said for the Navy’s aircraft
procurement, weapon procurement, and research and development (R&D) accounts, and the accounts relating
TABLE 3
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The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., last
year published an updated analysis of what it calls the “coming train wreck” be3
tween defense program goals and available resources. The title of this analysis
has made the train-wreck metaphor a well-established phrase in debates over future defense spending. This metaphor, however, may not be the best one, because it suggests that the conflict between programs and resources is still ahead,
that the services have not yet felt its effects, and that these effects, when they arrive, will come all at once, in a cataclysmic way.
The conflict between program goals and available resources, however, is already with us. It has been growing incrementally for the last several years, and
the tensions that have built up over that time have already begun to outstrip the
Navy’s strategies to generate internal budget savings, as well as the service’s other
temporary coping measures.
As a result of the tension between program goals and available resources,
Navy programs have undergone a succession of cutbacks and reductions in recent years. The cumulative effects of these reductions are difficult to discern unless one stands back and assesses them in their entirety—which sometimes can
be hard for military officers to do, since their career paths often move them from
one job to the next every two or three years. Rather than a train wreck, then, it
might be better to think of the effects of the imbalance between goals and resources
as akin to gradual oxygen deprivation: it happens slowly, its effects build up over
time, and the victim is likely not to be fully aware of what is happening. But in the
end, if not alleviated or at least well managed, it can be just as fatal as a train wreck.
A second feature of the Navy’s current situation is that in the midst of this
growing tension between programs and resources, there are proposals for increasing the Navy’s force structure from the current 318 or so ships to about 360
ships, so that the fleet can better meet the demands being placed on it, particularly for maintaining desired levels of forward deployments, without placing an
undue burden on the Navy’s personnel and equipment. Such an increase in force
structure would clearly require substantially more additional funding than
would be required to fund fully the current 310-ship program.
A third important feature of the Navy’s current situation is that since the middle of 1999 there has been an increased focus in debates over future U.S. defense
spending on the “revolution in military affairs” and on “defense transformation.”
The theme of transformation was featured prominently in the Defense Department’s presentations of its proposed defense plan to Congress in early 2000, and in
statements on defense policy that year by both sides in the presidential campaign.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/7
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WHERE WE MIGHT GO FROM HERE: FOUR GENERAL OPTIONS
Given this situation—the programs/resources imbalance, the proposals for increasing force structure, and increased interest in defense transformation—four
general options for future U.S. naval forces can be sketched out:

• The first of these options would stay on today’s path: it would maintain
today’s collection of programs and today’s level of resources. It is, in effect,
the baseline option.

• The second option would maintain today’s programs but seek the
additional resources needed to fund them fully—the ten billion (or more)
additional dollars per year mentioned earlier.

• The third option is force-structure expansion toward a fleet of something like
360 ships. This option would maintain today’s collection of programs in
expanded form and would require an even larger amount of money to achieve.

• The fourth option is transformation, which would involve changing the
current mix of programs. It could be implemented at various resource
levels, but since it is not usually spoken of today in connection with large
net increases in total resources, it can be associated here with today’s levels
of resources or something a bit higher.
First Notional Option—Stay on the Current Path
Choosing the first option would mean continuing the various strategies now being pursued to generate internal budget savings that would in turn be applied to
currently underfunded priorities, including modernization. These include familiar measures like regionalization of bases and of maintenance; competitive
sourcing and privatization; “smart ship,” “smart work,” and “smart base” initiatives; and also acquisition reform measures, such as multiyear procurement,
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) procurement, and using cost as an inde4
pendent variable (CAIV) in the design of new systems. This approach would
also continue to balance, as well as possible, near-term readiness against longer-term modernization. It would seek to protect core procurement programs,
the readiness of deployed forces, and selected R&D efforts leading toward a
moderate, gradual evolution of the force.
In theory, the internal savings produced by this strategy might be enough to
finance an increase in procurement rates approaching steady-state replacement
levels. This plan, however, depends on certain key, and rather optimistic, assumptions: that the money-saving strategies will be implemented as planned,
that they will generate the projected amounts of savings within a certain amount
of time, and that no unexpected needs for increased expenditures will
arise—that there will be no more financial shocks to the system.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
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This strategy appears to be a fragile one in that its success requires all these
factors to work out as planners hope. The experience of the last several years, in
fact, suggests that there is a good chance that one or more of these assumptions
will not pan out. Some strategies for saving money may be only partially implemented; some even of those that are fully implemented may not produce
hoped-for results; and unexpected financial demands could well arise.
If matters did not work out as planned, the result would be an intensification
of the challenges that the Navy now faces in trying to make ends meet. This strategy carries a high risk of producing,
The first thing to be said about the current sit- over time, a gradual erosion in force
uation is that the Navy’s current programs col- structure, an erosion that would belectively appear to be significantly larger than gin when today’s ships begin to retire
in large numbers after 2010 and parits current budget.
ticularly after 2020. The fleet could
fall below the current level of about 318 ships, and then below three hundred
ships, as the consequences of fifteen or twenty years of deferred procurement
begin to manifest themselves. This would lead to a corresponding reduction in
the number of ships that could be deployed forward at any one time. Similar
effects would become manifest in aircraft inventories. In general, there would
be pressure on the Navy’s ability to maintain required levels of readiness, with
the burden for this task falling increasingly on the backs of Navy personnel.
Also, there would be limited or spotty modernization; in place of new designs
and new production, there would be significant reliance on modified designs,
upgrades, and service-life extensions.
With regard to the potential for reduced forward-deployed operations, the
nation could respond to such a state of affairs in a number of ways. It could
simply accept reduced levels of forward-deployed forces, which could require
choosing to maintain higher levels of presence in one region at the expense of
presence in another, reducing the number of ships sent to each region, or reducing the fraction of the year that ships are deployed to various regions.
Alternatively, the nation could seek to maintain higher levels of forwarddeployed naval forces by increasing the number of ships that are “forward
homeported” in overseas operating areas. This would raise all of the traditional
issues associated with forward-homeported ships, including the need for hostnation acceptance; the possibility of host-nation restrictions on how the ships
are used; the risk of becoming excessively tied politically to one region at the expense of others; the issue of how and where these ships are to be maintained; and
the risk—the severity of which would depend on the host nation involved—of being evicted and seeing calculations made on the assumption of
forward homeporting upset.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/7

6

96

O'Rourke: Transformation and the Navy’s Tough Choices Ahead

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Finally, the nation could respond by seeking greater efforts from allies and
friends in support of maintaining regional security. This option, however, would
depend not just on the willingness of those allies and friends to take on this
responsibility but on their capability to do so as well. For naval forces, capability
is a significant consideration, since U.S. naval forces include platforms and
systems (and resulting capabilities) that are rare in or absent from the naval
forces of U.S. allies and friends, including carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft,
nuclear-powered attack submarines, surface combatants with highly capable
area-air-defense systems, land-attack cruise missiles, and substantial amphibious assault forces.
Optimistically, this first option would result in a fleet of about the size of today’s, with some amount of modernization. Less optimistically, the fleet would
have fewer ships than it does today, and the amount of modernization could be
meager. Either way, but particularly in the less optimistic scenario, this option
raises issues regarding both numerical and qualitative sufficiency for carrying
out potential missions fifteen or twenty years from now.
Second Notional Option: Fully Fund the Current Plan
Pursuing the second option—fully funding the currently planned 310-ship
force—would involve continuing the same money-saving measures described
under the first option while seeking the additional resources needed to fund today’s collection of programs more completely. These additional resources could
come from an increase in the defense budget top line or an increase in the Navy’s
share of the top line.
It is not clear whether the next administration will support an increase in the
defense budget so large that the Department of the Navy’s proportionate share
of that increase would amount to ten (or more) billion dollars per year. While
both presidential campaigns spoke in favor of maintaining a strong defense, neither committed itself specifically to an increase of this size. Moreover, the new
administration will face numerous competing federal budget priorities, such
as shoring up Social Security; financing new domestic program initiatives in
areas such as education, health care, and the environment; granting tax reduction; and carrying out debt reduction. In light of these competing federal budget
priorities, substantial growth in the defense top line, while possible, is by no
means certain.
The alternative of increasing the Department of the Navy’s share of the Defense Department’s top line has been mentioned regularly for many years now.
The experience of the past several years, however, suggests that mutually offsetting forces in the Pentagon tend to make such shifts difficult to achieve. All the
services will likely ask the new administration for more funding, and all of them

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
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will bring well developed arguments to bear. In practice, each service’s efforts
have tended to cancel out those of the others.
If the division of the defense budget changes, moreover, it might not be in the
Navy’s favor. The Army is now pursuing a force transformation, and policy makers on Capitol Hill, at least, have reacted very supportively to this initiative. On
this basis, one might argue that the most likely beneficiary of a defense-budget
reallocation would be the Army rather than the Department of the Navy.
If the Navy were to obtain enough new money to fund fully today’s programs,
then compared to the first option, force structure would be more stable, there
would be less pressure on readiness, and there would be somewhat more modernization. Current levels of presence could be maintained, and there would be
less need for compensatory measures like forward homeporting or increased reliance on allies. Whether this force would be sufficient numerically and qualitatively for tomorrow’s forward requirements, however, would still be in question. If the Navy did not succeed in obtaining all the additional needed resources, the outcome would be more like that of the first option, and the
adequacy of the force numerically and qualitatively would be more problematic.
Third Notional Option: Expand the Force Structure
The third option of increasing the Navy’s force structure toward 360 ships and
maintaining today’s collection of programs in expanded form would be pursued
like the second, except that the amount of additional resources to be sought
would be substantially greater. The question of an increased defense top line or
an increased Department of the Navy share would arise again, but in more intensified form.
This option offers a fairly wide array of potential outcomes, depending on
how much additional funding the Navy secured. If the Navy obtained most or all
of what it asks for, the Navy could over time build itself up toward the 360-ship
figure. Forward deployments could be expanded from present levels. Numerical
sufficiency would be less of an issue, or no problem at all, but qualitative sufficiency might still be an open question, particularly if the new money were devoted primarily to acquisition of current systems rather than development of
new ones. If, however, the Department of the Navy did not receive a large increase in resources, the outcome could be more like that of the second option or
the first, depending on the amount it did manage to obtain.
Fourth Notional Option: Transformation
The fourth notional option is transformation beyond that which is already reflected in the Department of the Navy’s plans. This option would involve altering today’s mix of programs and implementing this altered mix at a level of
funding about equal to or a bit higher than today’s level.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/7
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In discussing this fourth option, it should be noted that, in debates over future U.S. defense spending, the term “transformation” is currently being used in
two basic ways. The Defense Department and supporters of current defense
plans often use transformation to refer to measures to change U.S. military
forces that are already incorporated into the current Five-Year Defense Program,
and to such long-range Defense Department conceptual documents as Vision
2020. This is the kind of transformation to which the Defense Department referred when it presented its proposed fiscal 2001 budget to Congress in early
2000. For naval forces, these measures include, among other things, current
plans for implementing network-centric warfare in the fleet. It is an implicit feature of the three general options discussed above.
Those who believe present Defense Department efforts to implement transformation are inadequate use the term transformation in a different way—to
refer to measures that would change U.S. military forces more rapidly or extensively than now planned by the department. This is the kind of transformation
referred to under the fourth general option discussed here.
Although there has been much discussion of this more ambitious kind of
transformation since the early 1990s, and particularly over the last year or two, it
is still not clearly defined in terms of program content or cost. In relation to naval forces, it is typically characterized simply by citing specific proposals, such as
STREETFIGHTER, the Arsenal Ship, or the conversion of Trident ballistic-missile
submarines (SSBNs) to an SSGN configuration, carrying cruise missiles.
In general, however, it might be fair to say that this kind of transformation
can be contrasted from the first kind—the kind reflected in the other three
options—as involving different platforms and systems, different operational
concepts, and a greater emphasis on long-term investments (as opposed to
nearer-term programs). Its advocates argue that this kind of transformation is a
means to produce, for a given amount of resources, a force more effective against
future threats than one that would result from funding and implementing today’s collection of programs.
THE FOURTH OPTION: IMPLEMENTING TRANSFORMATION
A major question facing policy makers and others who support or are interested in
this kind of transformation is how to make it happen. What measures, in other
words, could policy makers consider taking (or encouraging others to take) to implement this second kind of transformation? The following are some candidate
measures that might form the core of a strategy for transforming U.S. naval forces.
Signaling. One measure to consider in beginning a transformation process
would be to make clear to people both outside and inside the naval community

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
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that transformation has become an important Department of the Navy priority,
even the top priority. Signaling to outsiders is important in terms of winning
support for any effort, particularly from Congress. The support that the U.S.
Army received in congressional markups of the fiscal 2001 defense budget for its
own transformation program is a good example. Signaling to members of the
naval community would be equally important, because it would alert them to
the facts that they may need to alter the focus of their efforts and that the current
distribution of resources may change.
RDT&E. A second item would be to expand research, development, testing, and
evaluation efforts so as to include a greater emphasis on “clean-sheet” designs
and prototyping. This is likely to require a substantial increase in the RDT&E
account—even more than what would be needed to fund more fully current
research and development programs—particularly for developing new designs
and building and testing prototypes. Instead of adding perhaps several hundred
million or a billion dollars to the Navy’s RDT&E account (as under the second
option discussed earlier), pursuing a transformation strategy might involve
adding some multiple of this amount—perhaps two or three times as much.
Experimentation. A third need—one that is often mentioned in connection
with transformation—is greater use of experimentation. This could include the
establishment of standing experimental forces to supplement the experimentation that can be carried out by general-purpose forces.
*******
These first three items come quickly to mind and are frequently mentioned in
discussions of transformation strategies. There are additional measures, however, that can be considered, some of which are less frequently mentioned.
Reassurance. One of these would be to reassure platform communities (that is,
the major sectors of the service closely involved with either surface ships, submarines, or aircraft) as well as program managers and contractors that transformation does not represent a mortal threat to their organizational well-being.
Institutions, like individuals, tend to prefer stability and continuity over instability and discontinuity. Transformation carries with it the prospect of the latter
and thus tends to elicit defensive reactions from people and organizations. The
likelihood of swift and vigorous defensive reactions may well have been increased by several years of defense downsizing, which has encouraged institutions and individuals to focus more intensely on self-preservation. Years of
program cutbacks and cancellations have encouraged a strong inclination toward “circling the wagons” and defending programs and priorities that have survived earlier reductions.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/7
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If transformation is to succeed, incentives would need to be changed so that
individuals would know that they can succeed and advance in a transformative
environment, and so that businesses would be confident of maintaining their
profitability. Program managers’ success should not be measured solely by their
ability to carry forward procurement programs that were designed years ago if
those programs are no longer appropriate, but rather on their ability to recognize where change may be needed and to move quickly to restructure the efforts.
Keeping NCW in Perspective. A fifth potential initiative would be not only to
emphasize network-centric warfare but set it in context, in terms of its place in
the intended transformation. Much excitement has been generated by networkcentric warfare, and for good reason. But in the midst of this enthusiasm, there is
a potential for simply equating transformation with network-centric warfare
and letting it go at that. That would be a mistake, for although network-centric
warfare is essential to transformation, a comprehensive transformation would
involve other changes as well.
Right now, the Navy is essentially superimposing network-centric capabilities
onto its existing force architecture. This will clearly increase Navy capabilities;
but network-centric warfare, which fundamentally alters the relationships between different elements of a force, makes possible wholly new naval force architectures that can differ from today’s fleet design. Indeed, exploiting the full
potential of network-centric warfare may actually demand a change in the current
force architecture. Simply applying it as a veneer over today’s force architecture
will limit the benefits it produces.
At a time when funds for the development and procurement of new designs
are limited, there is a temptation to use network-centric warfare as a rationale
for not investing in platforms and systems that could contribute to a new and
different force architecture. Misapplying the concept of NCW in this manner
would result in missed opportunities. Network-centric warfare will help a great
deal, but transformation does not begin and end there.
Force Architectures. The Navy does not show much evidence, at least to outside
observers, of having done very much work for years in the area of alternative force
architectures. The last completed major effort that was publicized outside the
Navy may have been a project conducted by Captain Clark “Corky” Graham at the
Naval Surface Warfare Center at Carderock, Maryland, in 1989–92. This architecture focused on a large, modular ship that went by various names, including
“carrier dock multimission” and “carrier of large objects,” the objects being such
5
things as aircraft, smaller scout/fighter ships, and amphibious forces.
Instead of alternative force architectures, the focus in recent years appears to
have been primarily on designing new platforms and systems for the current
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
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fleet concept. But with the Navy becoming ever more networked, and with the capabilities of individual platforms increasingly becoming functions of their
places in that network, the need
The total funding differential could be ten billion for paying more attention to the
design of the overall force is beor more dollars per year, depending on how rocoming increasingly urgent. Just
bustly the Navy’s current programs are funded.
as the designer of a ship should
seek to optimize the total ship (rather than its individual systems or components), the need now appears to be to optimize the architecture of the entire
naval force rather than simply the designs of the individual platforms that
make it up.
There are several new platform and system concepts now on the table, but
their merits and limitations will be less and less easy to identify and evaluate
except in the context of a larger force architecture. If the focus remains on
designing individual new platforms without parallel work on revised architectures, the result is likely to be a perpetuation of the current architecture, producing only next-generation versions of today’s platforms and allowing change only
through linear descent—stovepipe evolution, if you will.
It might turn out that a further elaboration of today’s force architecture is the
right approach to meeting tomorrow’s operational needs. But this cannot be
known with any confidence if the issue is not explored, and there is little evidence of such exploration in recent years. One hears references to a future “system of systems,” but the tendency is to consider this metasystem as a by-product
of individual platform and program development—something that will emerge
and evolve passively, from the bottom up. Such an approach could overlook
many of the opportunities that a more consciously designed “system of systems”
could offer for increasing fleet capabilities. To achieve not just any system of systems but the best one will require not just bottom-up evolution but top-down
concept generation as well.
One current example of focusing on optimizing the entire force architecture
and approaching fleet modernization from the top down is the U.S. Coast
Guard’s DEEPWATER acquisition project. This project, which aims at replacing a
large portion of the Coast Guard’s current deep-water-capable assets, is deliberately seeking to avoid a simple one-for-one replacement of cutter classes and
aircraft types. Instead, it focuses on identifying the most cost-effective force
architecture—that is, the optimum combination of surface platforms, air platforms, C4ISR* systems, and logistics systems—that technology now permits. The

* C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
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program would then procure the elements of this architecture in an integrated fashion.
This is an ambitious project for the Coast Guard, and that service faces several
challenges in implementing it successfully. Parts of what the Coast Guard is
attempting may not be appropriate or practical for the Navy to consider. Even
so, it is worth examining for the lessons it can provide for thinking about future
naval force architectures and for achieving them.
What might a transformed naval force architecture include? Elements that
are frequently mentioned include a greater reliance on unmanned vehicles
(including autonomous vehicles), increased use of distributed sensor networks,
and new kinds of ships.
The possibilities for ships are quite diverse. In comparison to current designs,
they could have larger and more varied payloads; they could be much more
modular; they could be significantly
smaller, or significantly larger; they
All the services will likely ask . . . for more
could have much higher maximum
funding and . . . bring well developed arguments to bear. In practice, each service’s efforts speeds; and they could take advantage
of nontraditional hull forms. They
have tended to cancel out those of the others.
could be hybrid ships, mixing, say, the
functions of an aircraft carrier and surface combatant, or a surface combatant
and an amphibious ship. They could be “mother ships,” deploying large numbers of smaller ships and unmanned platforms; they could be mobile offshore
bases rather than ships at all. They could be derived from commercial designs.
All these things have been proposed at one time or another.
An effective strategy to develop alternative force architectures might have
three primary aspects. First, it could involve parallel efforts by multiple groups.
Alternative force architectures could take various shapes, and the most promising
candidates are likely to be discovered more quickly if a number of groups try
independently to find them. These groups could be recruited from a variety of
settings—the fleet, the platform communities, government laboratories, industry, universities, and think tanks. Each kind of group would have different
strengths and limitations. For example, a group whose members are drawn from
one of the Navy’s platform communities might create architectures that expanded the capabilities of that platform in ways that other groups might not
think of; on the other hand, however, it would understandably be disinclined to
propose an architecture that downplayed or eliminated that platform.
Similarly, an industry group might have a better understanding of how to
apply cutting-edge technologies, particularly from the commercial arena, to create new force architectures. It might be less bound by force-design traditions
than people working within Navy offices, and it would be likely to have a keener
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appreciation for producibility considerations. But a group whose members were
drawn from the “widget” industry could not be expected to advance an architecture, whatever its merits, that did not require widgets.
A second potential element of an effort to generate alternative naval force architectures would be a greater use of simulation-based design as applied to the
entire force rather than individual ships. The nation cannot afford to build new
architectures for experimental purposes, and the Navy could sift through the
many possibilities more quickly through intensive modeling and assessment.
Lastly, developing new force architectures should not be thought of as a
one-time exercise but as a continuing effort, so that it can incorporate new developments and the contributions of new participants.
Operational Concepts. The need for new operational concepts is frequently discussed in connection with transformation. Much of this discussion concerns
proposed operational concepts for warfighting and crisis response operations,
and this part of the discussion does not need to be further elaborated here. The
discussion of new operational concepts, however, arguably should not stop with
warfighting and crisis-response operations, because it can also include consideration of new concepts for how to maintain normal forward-deployment and
presence operations. A key goal here would be to identify concepts that can reduce the Navy’s current “station-keeping multipliers”—the numbers of ships of
given kinds needed to keep one such ship on station in an overseas operating
area. These multipliers are considerably higher than people often assume. Although it has often been asserted with conviction over the years, even by admirals,
that it takes three Navy ships to keep one on station, the actual station-keeping
multipliers for Navy ships are in fact more like five to one, or six to one for ships
homeported in the continental United States—the exact numbers depending on
the category of ship in question, the specific overseas operating area involved,
and (for deployments to the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region) whether the
6
ship is homeported on the East or West Coast.
In the post–Cold War era, these station-keeping multipliers have been used
extensively to justify Navy force levels. Indeed, for several years now the Navy’s
force-structure requirements have been based primarily on the number of ships
necessary to maintain established levels of presence overseas, and only secondarily on warfighting needs.
Although these station-keeping multipliers are effective force-level justifiers,
they also reflect a high operational-cycle “overhead”—the fact that the Navy
must procure a large number of expensive platforms to keep a fraction of them
deployed on station at any one time. Reducing the multiplier might permit a
smaller number of ships to maintain a given level of presence. Frequently
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mentioned strategies for accomplishing this include double-crewing ships and
scheduling long-duration deployments coupled with crew rotation, as was envisaged for the Arsenal Ship. Even after taking into account the additional costs
of such measures—for additional crews, more shore-based training facilities, and
shorter ship-service lives—this approach might produce net savings that could
be devoted to research and development or acquisition.
Measures like these to reduce station-keeping multipliers could be applied
only insofar as they did not leave the fleet with insufficient forces for warfighting.
They also raise serious issues concerning maintenance, training, and
Incentives would need to be changed so that
individuals would know that they can succeed crews’ sense of “ownership” of the
and advance . . . and so that businesses would ships they serve on—which can conbe confident of maintaining their profitability. tribute to the efforts they make on
behalf of their ships. These issues are
by no means trivial and may prove difficult to resolve. But that should not disqualify them from consideration as potential components of transformation.
The Acquisition System. If much of this is to be accomplished, significant
changes might need to be made to the Defense Department acquisition system,
particularly in terms of how proposed systems are evaluated and justified. One
potential change would be to reduce the emphasis the system puts on replacing
specific capabilities that are now being provided by systems approaching retirement age. This approach encourages decisions in favor of replacing older systems with new-generation versions of the same things—a replacement-in-kind
strategy that leads to force modernization by linear descent and to a consequent perpetuation of the current force architecture. Instead, the acquisition
system could be broadened to accept justification of proposed systems in terms
of how they make sense within a future force architecture, irrespective of
whether they exactly replace the capabilities of systems being retired, and even if
they would result in overlaps of capabilities with other systems that are still years
away from retirement.
If transformation is to involve greater use of prototypes, then the acquisition system might need to be changed so that the large up-front design costs
associated with developing prototypes can be justified more in terms of their
demonstrative (as opposed to purely operational) benefits. In addition, if transformation would mean frequent design changes during production, and frequent
modification or restructuring of programs, then the acquisition system would
need to be changed so that the assessed cost-effectiveness of proposed systems is
not dependent on completing lengthy production runs of stable designs.
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Finally, if transformation were to include increased use of experimentation,
the acquisition system arguably should be changed to reduce its current emphasis
on avoiding test failures at all costs on the grounds that such failures are inherently wasteful. This potential kind of waste should be compared to the more
subtle forms of waste that can result when the emphasis on avoiding test failures
at all costs slows down the replacement of inappropriate or cost-ineffective systems. Just as the Navy is trying to move away from the “zero-defect” mentality in
its personnel policies, so too might it consider, in a transformative era, moving
away from an acquisition system with a zero-defects orientation. The Navy (and
the Defense Department generally) would need to recognize that if transformation is the goal, an absence of mistakes can be evidence of insufficient effort.
The current acquisition system can be viewed as, among other things, a huge
system for avoiding errors and apportioning the blame when something goes
wrong. A transformed acquisition system would encourage people to take risks
when appropriate and protect them from blame or criticism for errors that result from honest efforts to discover something new.
Agile Manufacturing. Lastly, industry, in coordination with government efforts
to change the acquisition system, can assist in the transformation process by altering its business model so that its operations are no longer built so much
around the concept of executing long production runs of stable designs. Under
this new model, profitability in the future would be derived more principally
from research and development work, prototyping, and short production runs
or longer runs with frequent changes in design. These activities would need to be
viewed by industry as a significant and stable source of profits. The idea of operating profitably on the basis of short production runs of frequently changing
designs is established in certain commercial industries that must contend with
rapid changes in product technology or with frequent shifts in consumer preferences. The practices adopted by these commercial firms may be able to provide
lessons in how to accomplish the same thing in defense production.
Moving toward this new business model, which might be called “agile manufacturing,” would likely involve the adoption of new production capabilities and
processes. Defense firms have already made significant strides in adopting new
production capabilities and processes in areas such as “lean” manufacturing
(which involves, among other things, the avoidance of tools and jigs that are
suitable for producing only one kind of item) and “flexible” manufacturing
(which includes systems that can produce various components in small quantities in response to user demands for individual spare parts). Agile manufacturing would build on these improvements to put prototyping, limited
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production runs, and rapidly changing designs more at the center of a firm’s
business operations.
These are not the only elements that might be included in a successful transformation strategy, but a strategy that lacked elements like these would be less likely
to achieve its goals. Policy makers in the new administration and the 107th Congress may consider what a transformed naval force might look like and whether
it would be better than the force that might result from pursuing the three alternative options discussed earlier. Their views on these issues will no doubt vary,
but the Navy and the nation will likely benefit from the debate.
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